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[December 10, 2008]
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On December 10, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), reproduced below, commemorating the 60th
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).1 In so doing, it rectified a three-decades-old
asymmetry in international human rights law: the lack of an individual communications procedure for alleged

violations of the ICESCR.

This asymmetry, reflected in the establishment of an individual complaints procedure for the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and virtually every other United Nations human rights treaty adopted in
the interim,2 traces back to an important U.N. General Assembly decision taken in 1952. Charged with drafting
an International Bill of Rights, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights had by 1947 decided that the Bill would
consist of a declaration, a convention, and measures of implementation.3 The first of those, the UDHR, was
finalized and adopted on December 10, 1948. Predicated on an understanding that the ideal of human dignity
could not be secured without equal attention to the full family of civil, cultural, economic, political and social
rights, which could not be divided or considered in isolation from each other, it comprised in one consolidated
text the full scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms.4
As the Commission turned its attention to making these rights legally binding in the form of an International

Covenant on Human Rights, a split emerged among its Members. In 1950, a "policy decision" was requested
from the General Assembly on whether the Covenant should be divided in two, with one Covenant focusing on

civil and political rights and the other on economic, social and cultural rights.5 Such division was necessary,
proponents argued, as the norms in question formed ' 'two different kinds of rights and obligations" and hence
required different enforcement mechanisms.6 Specifically, understood as negative restraints on State action, only
civil and political rights were perceived as susceptible to immediate legislative application and legal enforcement.
Economic, social and cultural rights, it was contended, were "equally important" but were "programme" rights
rather than "legal" rights, and hence required distinct methods of both implementation and enforcement.7
Significantly, the General Assembly rejected this view, insisting that a single Covenant be drafted that included

economic, social and cultural rights. Stipulating insertion "either in the draft Covenant or in separate protocols,"9
it expressly instructed the Commission to consider provisions "for the receipt and examination of petitions from
individuals and organizations with respect to alleged violations of the Covenant."10 In so doing, it reiterated that
the enjoyment of all human rights "are interconnected and interdependent" and that "when deprived of economic,
social and cultural rights man does not represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as
the ideal of the free man [sic]."11

With increasingly sharp lines being drawn around the two "categories" of rights, and Western and Soviet-bloc
States lining up on either side of the divide,12 the issue became increasingly intertwined with Cold War politics.
In late 1951, the General Assembly was requested to "reconsider" its previous decision.13 With a standoff looming,
risking extended delay in the drafting process, the General Assembly reversed its 1950 decision in 1952, now
requesting the Commission "to draft two Covenants on Human Rights ... one to contain civil and political rights
and the other to contain economic, social and cultural rights."14 To emphasize their unity of purpose and "to
ensure respect for and observance of human rights," the two were nonetheless to contain as many similar provisions

as possible and to be submitted simultaneously for adoption.15
Two separate covenants were thus drafted,16 each reflecting in key aspects of their construction a stylized view
of the rights in question. The ICCPR's rights were drafted with primary emphasis on their negative aspects, while

those in the ICESCR emphasized their corresponding positive dimensions. Likewise, though parallel in each of
their operative parts, the general obligations clauses of the two treaties were drafted to underscore, in the ICESCR's
case, the progressive nature of the "full realization" of rights and the real-world limits of available resources,
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while those of the ICCPR referenced neither, highlighting instead the need for legislative measures and effective
remedies.17 By amplifying only certain aspects of the rights and duties in question?aspects today recognized as

constitutive of all fundamental rights18?these constructions reinforced a conception that only the norms in the
ICCPR were susceptible to independent oversight and judicial enforcement. Correspondingly, while the ICCPR
created an international body of independent experts to receive interstate complaints and to monitor the progressive
implementation of treaty norms through States' periodic reports (i.e., the Human Rights Committee), the ICESCR

entrusted supervision to a political body, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Only the ICCPR was
accompanied by an Optional Protocol contemplating an individual complaints mechanism.
The impact of these decisions was significant. The Human Rights Committee, beginning its work in 1978, promptly

began developing a comprehensive jurisprudence on the rights under the ICCPR, drawing from the concrete,
contextualized situations of individualized abuse it considered under the communications procedure.19 By contrast,
ECOSOC effectively neglected its supervisory mandate during the ICESCR's first decade in force. It was not until
1985 that ECOSOC, in recognition of its supervisory inattentiveness, authorized the creation of an independent
body of experts, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), to take over its supervisory
tasks.20 Even then, the CESCR could not address the individual dimensions of the rights it supervised, being
limited to the consideration of general situations as reported in States' periodic reports. 1

Consequently, as early as 1990, the CESCR began to call formally for an Optional Protocol, with a view to
establishing an individual complaint mechanism. According to the CESCR, this was necessary not only to increase
the stature and seriousness accorded to the ICESCR, but, by allowing the Committee to speak directly to concrete
instances of abusive conduct, to provide more effective protection to individual victims and clearer normative
guidance on the nature of rights and the scope of legitimate restrictions on them in distinct contexts. By engaging

States in discussions of appropriate responsive measures to particularized abuses, it could, moreover, better
encourage the development of effective domestic remedies and increase public attention to economic, social and

cultural rights.22
In 1992, the CESCR prepared a draft proposal on an optional protocol, submitting a statement and analytical paper

on the issue to the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights.23 The Conference responded by declaring
that "[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated ... [and are to be treated]
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis," and by calling upon the U.N. Human Rights Commission "to

continue examination of optional protocols" to the ICESCR in cooperation with the CESCR.24
In December 1994, the Committee submitted to the Commission on Human Rights a report entitled "Draft optional
protocol providing for the consideration of communications"25 and in 1996, following consultations,26 a revised
draft. In 2001, having sent the revised draft to Governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs for

comments in 1997,27 the Commission appointed an Independent Expert, Mr. Hatem Kotrane, to examine the
question of a draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.28 Following two reports from the Independent Expert
submitted in 2002 and 2003,29 the Commission decided to establish an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)
"with a view to considering options regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the ICESCR."30 Chaired
by Ms. Catarina de Albuquerque of Portugal, the Working Group held five ten-day sessions from 2004 to 2008.31

Although the Working Group's first session in 2004 ended without any decision, the Chairperson was given a
mandate at the second session to prepare a report containing elements of an OP with a view to facilitating discussions

at the third session in 2006.32 The "elements paper"33 lay out alternatives for each of the major issues in debate.
Four merit highlighting. The first addressed broad disagreement within the OEWG over whether the OP should

adopt a "comprehensive approach" to subject matter jurisdiction, like all other U.N. treaties, or an "a-la-carte
approach," as is done under the European Social Charter, in which States pick and choose among norms they
recognize as subject to the communications procedure.34 A second disagreement, also related to ratione materiae
jursidiction, addressed the scope of the Committee's competence to find violations of norms in Parts I, II, and/or

only III of the Covenant.35 A third contested issue addressed the Committee's ratione personae jurisdiction and
legal standing: whether the complaint mechanism should be limited to "individuals or groups of individuals"
(like most U.N. treaties), collective complaints (like the Revised European Social Charter and ILO complaint
procedure), or allow for both types of communications. And, fourth, disagreement persisted over the precise
definition of State obligations under article 2 of the Covenant, and specifically how the concept of ' 'progressive

realization" and "available resources" would be interpreted in an individual complaints procedure.36 Although
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these issues remained heavily contested until the final session in 2008, each was ultimately resolved in favor of
the approach adopted in other U.N. treaties, rather than as adopted in regional or specialized systems.
On Friday April 4, 2008, on the last day of its fifth session, the Working Group adopted its report ad referendum,
agreeing to transmit the draft OP-ICESCR to the Human Rights Council for its consideration. In June 2008, the
Council approved the draft text by consensus,38 and it was adopted and opened for signature by the U.N. General

Assembly on December 10, 2008. The optional protocol will come into force three months after deposit of the
tenth instrument of ratification or accession.39

The resulting text is similar to the optional protocol to the ICCPR in most respects, but adds several important
features, many drawn from the optional protocols to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against

Women (OP-CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OP-CRPD). For example,
like OP-CEDAW and OP-CRPD, the OP-ICESCR expressly empowers the Committee to issue interim measures
to protect individuals from irreparable harm and obligates States parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure
that individuals under their jurisdiction are not subject to any form of ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence

of communicating with the Committee.40 Likewise, the optional protocol borrows innovative language from the
OP-CRPD in which it obligates States parties to ensure wide public access to, and knowledge of the ICESCR, its
optional protocol, and the CESCR's views and recommendations, including though their dissemination "in accessi
ble formats for persons with disabilities."41 It also requires that the Committee open its good offices to pursuit
of friendly settlements.42

The optional protocol includes two additional features not included in the OP-ICCPR. First, following OP-CEDAW

and OP-CRPD?and drawing upon the old 1503 procedure of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights?it creates
an inquiry procedure in which the Committee is empowered to conduct a confidential inquiry, including potential
onsite visits, where it receives reliable information indicating "grave or systematic violations" of the ICESCR's

rights by a State party.43 Unlike the CEDAW and CRPD optional protocols, however, the OP-ICESCR procedure
is an opt-in mechanism, rather than an opt-out one. Second, not only is the Committee empowered to send requests
for technical assistance to the specialized U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, but the optional protocol mandates
the establishment of a trust fund to provide expert and technical assistance to States Parties for the "enhanced
implementation'' of the rights contained in the Covenant.44 Such assistance is ' 'without prejudice'' to the obligations
States undertake by ratifying the Covenant45 As clarified by the CESCR, the '"availability of resources,' although
an important qualifier to the obligation to take steps, does not alter the immediacy of the obligation, nor can
resource constraints justify inaction."46

Two features nonetheless differentiate the OP-ICESCR from all other U.N. treaties. The first is a jurisdictional
provision permitting the CESCR to discretionarily decline to consider a communication where it ' 'does not reveal

that the author [sic47] has suffered a clear disadvantage."48 This provision, recalling Protocol No. 14 to the
European Convention on Human Rights, responds to a concern that large numbers of "trivial petitions" would
be lodged with the Committee, thereby distracting it from other essential functions, such as its periodic reporting
competence 49 It prevailed in negotiations notwithstanding frequent reminders that no other U.N. treaty body has
experienced this phenomenon, given the strictness of their respective admissibility rules, rules the CESCR shares
under the OP. While the Human Rights Committee, like most other human rights bodies, has recognized the degree

of impact on an individual's enjoyment of protected rights as a relevant factor in determining state responsibility
for an alleged violation, it has done so at the merits stage only (in the exercise of proportionality review), not as

a matter of admissibility.50
Another significant difference with other U.N. treaties is that, in light of continuing misconceptions about the
nature of State duties correlative to social rights, the OP-ICESCR provides directive guidance to the Committee
as to how the conduct-based duty to "take steps" is to be interpreted under the individual complaints procedure.
It stipulates that the Committee "shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party," bearing
in mind that "the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the implementation of the rights
set forth in the Covenant."51 This construction was included as a compromise between persistent proposals to
include a direct reference to States' "broad margin of appreciation" and those insisting that such a margin is not

always "broad" and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.52
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Taken as a whole, the adoption of the OP-ICESCR is highly significant. It promises to put to rest some of the
most persistent criticisms regarding the adjudication of claims based on economic, social and cultural rights,
criticisms that generally prevail only at the level of the abstract.53 As the Committee engages with new sets of
claims centered not on abstract violations and diffuse population-wide setbacks in rights enjoyment, but rather on
concrete harms to individuals caused by identifiable state conduct, a more refined and grounded jurisprudence
will appear. That jurisprudence is one delimited both by the Committee's case-based justiciability requirements,
shared with the Human Rights Committee, such as individualized harm and causal imputation to State conduct,54
and by the necessary balancing required by proportionality analysis and other forms of merits-based 4 'reasonableness
review."55 In this respect, the jurisprudence of the CESCR under the OP-ICESCR is not likely to look significantly
different from that currently being established in the areas of the rights to health, education, culture, housing,
social security and work by the Human Rights, CERD, and CEDAW Committees, particularly in their emphasis
on preventative safeguards, transparent and participative decisionmaking processes, and the institution of effective
local remedies for specific abusive conduct.56 Neither is it likely to look significantly different from the rapidly
expanding jurisprudence of either the regional human rights systems or many national-level constitutional courts
adjudicating in the area?either in the standards of substantive review the Committee employs or in the substantial

discretion reserved for local political authorities in the crafting of appropriate remedial responses.57
The obvious consequence will be a clearer appreciation that the adjudication of claims based on economic, social
and cultural rights does not entail different legal standards than those applied to claims based on civil and political

norms, either at admissibility, merits or remedial stages.58 The legal principles and standards of international human
rights law apply equally to both. It is not, then, a pronounced increase in either the quantity or quality of international

litigation that should be expected of the OP-ICESCR's adoption. Rather, its contribution will be both more subtle
and more important: to better focus the attention of public opinion on economic, social and cultural rights, on the
legal principles and safeguards that must be respected in the drafting, implementation and monitoring of public
policies and programs that affect them, and on nationally appropriate ways to provide effective remedies for
concrete violations where arbitrary or otherwise unjustified interferences are found.
As the High Commissioner on Human Rights stressed in her report to the Working Group in 2008, the establishment

of a communications procedure under the ICESCR ' 'will send a strong and unequivocal message about the equal
value and importance of all human rights . . . help[ing to] put to rest the notion that legal and quasi-judicial
remedies are not relevant for the protection of economic, social and cultural rights."59 Overcoming this long
standing misconception, and hence opening the door to more concerted public attention to economic, social and
cultural rights and to the shape of public policies that affect them, is, in the final analysis, likely to be the
OP-ICESCR's most significant contribution.
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